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The American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law of Contracts with Annotations to
the Washington Decisions*
Chapter 4
FORMATION OF FORMAL CONTRACTS**
Contracts Under Seal
Section 95. REQUIREMENTS FOR SEALED CONTRACT.
The requirements of the law for the formation of a contract
under seal are
(a) A sealed written promise and delivery, either uncon-
ditionally or in escrow, of the document containing
it; and if the delivery is in escrow, the happening of
the condition on which delivery is made;
(b) A promisor and a promisee each of whom has legal
capacity to act as such in the proposed sealed con-
tract; and each of whom is so named or described
in the document as to be capable of identification
when it is delivered,
(c) Acceptance by the promisee or grantee in the case
stated in Section 105;
(d) That the transaction, though satisfying the previous
requirements, must not be void by statute or by
special rules of the common law
Comment
a. The explanation of these requirements is given in Sections 96-
110. The word "written" and the word "writing" not only m
the present section, but throughout the Restatement include print-
ing and others means of impressing characters on paper or other sub-
stance. The non-existence of one or more of the requisites stated
in the section does not preclude the formation of an informal con-
tract if the requisites for such a contract exist.
b. A contract under seal is almost invariably signed, but such a
contract is possible without signature.
ANNOTATION
Section 95. The common law affect of seals is varied in Washington by
statute.
The use of private seals upon all deeds, mortgages, leases, bonds, and
other instruments, and contracts in writing, including deeds from a hus-
band to his wife and from a wife to her husband for their respective com-
munity right, title, interest or estate in all or any portion of their com-
munity real property is hereby abolished, and the addition of a private
seal to any such instrument or contract in writing hereafter made shall
not affect its validity or legality in any respect. L. '23, Chap. 23, Sec. 1.
Appd. Feb. 23, 1923. Rem. Comp. Stat. (1933), Sec. 10556.
All deeds, mortgages, leases, bonds, and other instruments and con-
tracts in writing, including deeds from a husband to his wife and from
a wife to her husband for their respective community right, title, interest
or estate in all or any portion of their community real property which
have heretofore been executed without the use of a private seal are, not-
withstanding, hereby declared to be legal and valid. L. '23, Chap. 23, Sec.
*The absence of annotations to particular sections of the Restatement
indicates that no Washington decisions have been found on the principle
therein stated.
**Continued from last issue.
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2. Appd. Feb. 23, 1923. Rem. Comp. Stat. (1933) Sec. 10557.
Notwithstanding that a broker's unauthorized contract to sell real
estate does not disclose the name of his principal and is under seal, it
may be ratified by the principal in view of Rem. & Bal. Code, Sec. 8751
abolishing the use of private seals, McLeod v. Eshema , 66 W 683, 120
P. 528 (1912).
Section 96. DEFINITION OF A SEAL.
A seal is a piece of wax, a wafer or other substance,
affixed to the paper or other material on which a promise,
release or conveyance is written, or a scroll or sign, however
made, on such paper or other material, or an impression
made thereon; provided that by a recital or by the appear-
ance of the document an intention of the promisor, releasor
or grantor is manifested that the substance, scroll, sign or
impression shall be a seal.
Comment
a. The definition of a seal m the section is based partly on the
common law and partly on statutes that have been enacted m most
States where seals are still m use.
b. Under the section the question whether a seal is upon a docu-
ment is to be determined from the document itself. Evidence of
extrinsic circumstances is not admissible to prove or disprove this.
Such circumstances may, however, be shown to aid the determina-
tion of the questions whether a promisor affixed or adopted a seal
(see Section 98) and whether the document has been delivered (see
Section 102).
Section 97. WHMN A PROMISE IS SEALED.
A written promise is sealed if the promisor affixes or im-
presses a seal on the document or adopts a seal already
thereon.
Section 98. WHAT AMOUNTS TO ADOPTION OF A SEAL.
(1) A promisor who delivers a written promise to which
a seal has been previously affixed or impressed with
apparent reference to his signature, thereby adopts
the seal.
(2) A promisor who delivers a written promise to which
a seal has been previously affixed or impressed with
apparent reference to the signature of another party
to the document is presumed to have adopted the
seal unless extrinsic circumstances show a contrary
intention.
Comment
a. Under the rule stated m Subsection (1) extrinsic evidence is
not admissible, under the rule stated m Subsection (2) such evi-
dence is admissible.
Section 99. ADOPTION OF THE SAME SEAL BY SEvEiI= PARTIES.
Any number of parties to the same instrument may adopt
one seal.
Section 100. REcITAL OF SEALING OR Duvmy.
A recital of the sealing or of the delivery of a written
promise is not essential to its validity as a sealed contract.
Comment
a. A recital may be of importance to show that a dash or scroll
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after a signature is a seal (see Section 96) , but the recital is not
an independent requirement, so that if a wafer or other object
attached to a written promise is evidently a seal, a sealed contract
is formed though there is no recital.
Section 101. SATLED PROMISE DELIVERED UNCONDITIONALLY OR
IN ESCROW
A promise under seal may be delivered by the promisor
unconditionally, in which case there is a present contract
under seal, or may be delivered in escrow, in which case
there is no present contract under seal. Delivery may be
made either unconditionally or in escrow to the promisee
or to any other person.
Comment
a. The section by its terms is applicable to the power of a prom-
isor to subject himself to a duty It does not enable a promisor
by inserting in a document not only his own promise, but what
purports to be a promise by the promisee, to subject the latter to a
duty by delivering the document to a third person. If, however, a
promisor attempts this, his own promise is likewise ineffective
until the promisee by accepting the document assents to assume the
the stated duty (see Sections 105-107)
Section 102. WHAT A OUNTS TO UNCONDITIONAL DELiVERY.
A promise under seal is delivered unconditionally when
the promisor puts it out of his possession with the apparent
intent to create immediately a contract under seal, unless
the promisee then knows that the promisor has not such
actual intent.
Section 103. WHAT AMOUNTS To DELIvERY IN ESCROW AND ITS
EFFECT.
(1) A promise under seal is delivered in escrow by the
promisor when he puts it out of his possession with-
out reserving a power of revocation, and with the ex-
pressed intent that the promise shall become a con-
tract under seal upon the happening in the future
of some condition not expressed in the document,
and shall not become a contract under seal until that
time. This condition must be something other than
the promisor's future mental desire or intention.
(2) On the happening of such a condition as is stated in
Subsection (1) the promise becomes a contract un-
der seal. Until the time has elapsed for the hap-
pening of the condition that was fixed by the prom-
isor when he delivered the document, or, if he then
fixed no time, until a reasonable time has elapsed
for the happening of the condition, the promisor has
no power to annual the delivery Thereafter he has
a right to reclaim the document, if the condition has
not happened.
Comment
a. Delivery in escrow is to be distinguished from delivery to hold
as agent for the promisor.
LAW OF CONTRACTS
Section 104. ACCEPTANCE OR DISCLAIMER BY THE PROMISEE OF
uNILATERAL SEATED CONTRACT.
(1) Acceptance by the promisee in the case of a promise
under seal is not essential to the formation of a uni-
lateral contract, nor is knowledge of the existence of
the promise; but a promisee who has not accepted
such a promise may, within a reasonable time after
learning of its existence and terms, render it moper-
ative from the beginning by disclaimer.
(2) Acceptance or disclaimer is irrevocable.
Section 105.ACCEPTANCE BY THE PROMISEE OF A BILATERAL
SEALED CONTRACT.
Acceptance by the promisee or grantee in the case of a
sealed promissory writing or conveyance which purports to
contain a return promise by him is essential to create any
contractual obligation.
Comment
a. In order to subject the promisee or grantee to a duty he
must express assent thereto, and unless he makes the promie stated
in the writing, promises in his favor are equally inoperative, since
it is not contemplated that one promise shall be made without the
other.
b. The case of a grantee is included in the Section and in Sec-
tions 106, 107 though the subject of this Restatement does not in-
elude conveyances, because a deed of conveyance by A to B may
contain as one of its provisions a promise by B. It is the effect
of such a provision that is stated in these Sections.
Section 106. WHAT AMOUNTS TO ACCEPTANCE OF INSTRUMENT.
Acceptance in the case of a sealed promissory writing or
conveyance consists of a manifestation of assent to the de-
livery thereof, made to the promisor or grantor or to a per-
son to whom the document has been delivered in escrow.
Such manifestation must comply with any requirement im-
posed by the promisor or grantor. It may be made either
before or after delivery If made before delivery it is re-
vocable until the moment of delivery.
Section 107 CREATION OF INFORMAL CONTRACT BY ACCEPTANCE
BY PROMISEE.
One who accepts but does not sign or seal a sealed docu-
ment which contains not only a conveyance or a promise
to him or for his benefit, but also words expressing a prom-
ise by him thereby makes the promise expressed in the doc-
ument, but the promise so made by him is not under seal,
and whether it is binding depends upon the rules governing
informal contracts.
Section 108. REQ'JIREMENT OF NmrNG OR DESCRIBING PROM-
ISOR AND PROMISEE.
A promise under seal is not operative as a contract under
seal unless both the promisor and the promisee are named
or so described therein as to be capable of identification
when the writing is delivered.
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Comment
a. It is a requirement of a sealed contract that all facts esential
to a determination of all the terms of the contract appear in the
document. Attempts to make a contract under seal, which are in-
effectual as such for failure to observe this principle, may, how-
ever, create an informal contract, if the requirements of such a
contract exist.
Section 109. ENFORCEMENT OF A SEALED CONTRACT BY PROM-
ISEE WHO DOES NOT SIGN OR SEAL IT.
The promisee of a promise under seal is not precluded
from enforcing it as a sealed contract because he has not
signed or sealed the document, unless his doing so was a
condition of the delivery, whether the document does or does
not contain also a promise by him.
Comment
a. Other circumstances (as indicated by Sections 105, 107) than
the fact that the promisee has not signed or sealed the document
may prevent the promisee from acquiring a right, but the failure to
sign or seal does not itself have this effect, unless a condition so
providing is imposed when the document is delivered.
Section 110. SEALED CONTRACT WITHOUT CONSIDERATION.
It is not essential in order to make a promise under seal
operative as a sealed contract that consideration be given
for the promise.
ANNOTATION
A contract under seal still imports consideration, notwithstanding L.
'88, Chap. 97, Sec. 1, abolishing private seals, Considine v. Gallagher 31
W 669, 72 P 469 (1903) Alunro v. National Surety Uo., 47 W 488, 92 P
280 (1907) Golle v. State Bank, 52 W 437, 100 P 984 (1909) But lack
of consideration may be shown as a matter of defense, the presumption of
consideration being rebuttable, Gates v. Herr 102 W 131, 172 P 912(1918).
Chapter 5
DUTIES AND RIGHTS WHERE MORE PERSONS THAN
ONE ARE PROMISORS OR PROMISEES OF THE
SAME PERFORMANCE
Section 111. JOINT, SEVERAL OR JOINT AND SEVERAL PROMISORS
OR PROMISEES.
(1) Two or more parties to a contract who promise to the
same promisee that the same performance shall be
given, thereby bind themselves
(a) jointly, or
(b) severally, or
(c) jointly and severally,
according to the rules stated in Sections 112-127
(2) Two or more parties to a contract who are promised
by the same promisor that the same performance
shall be given, thereby acquire
(a) a joint right, or
(b) several rights, or
(c) joint and several rights,
according to the rules stated in Sections 128-132.
LAW OF CONTRACTS
Comment
a. It is possible for several persons to contract to render as many
distinct performances. In such a case each promisor not only be-
comes subject to a duty different from that of the other prom-
isors, but the performance for which he brads himself is different
from the performance for which the other promisors bid them-
selves. Each of such contractual duties is subject to the same
rules that would be applicable if none of the other duties existed.
It is also possible for several promisors to undertake severally that
a single performance shall take place. In such a case though there
are several duties, only one performance is due. Reference to the
latter class of several duties is necessary in connection with the
rules governing joint promses, because it is possible that a number
of persons not only promise jointly that a specified performance
shall take place, but may also each of them severally make a prom-
ise identical in terms with the joint promise.
ANNOTATIoN
Subsection (1) (a). Where a complaint in an action for breach of con-
tract alleged that the contract was entered into by one of the defendants,
acting for himself and his co-defendants, and all of the defendants filed a
joint answer containing a general denial only, all were bound jointly upon
proof of the contract as alleged, Carlisle Packing Co. v. Deming, 62 W 455,
114 P. 172 (1911).
Section 112. WnnmN Two OR MORE PROiSORS OF THE SAME
PERFORmAN E ARiE BouND Joiw LY.
Except as qualified by Sections 115, 116, where two or
more parties to a contract promise the same performance
to the same promisee they incur only a joint duty unless the
contrary is stated, or unless the terms of the promise or the
extrinsic circumstances indicate an intention on their part
to be bound severally, or jointly and severally The fact
that one promisor is under a duty to the other to perform
the promise or that one promisee has received all or the
greater portion of the consideration does not prevent their
duty from being joint.
ANNOTATIoN
Landers v. Foster, 34 W 674, 76 P. 274 (1904) held that parties who
have jointly entered into a contract for the purchase of an interest in a
patent cannot escape liability therein because the interest purchased was,
by their authority, conveyed to one of their number instead of to all.
Section 113. W ENm Two OR MORE PROmisoRs ARE SivFRAL
Bou-D.
Where two or more parties to a contract promise separate
performances, to be rendered respectively by each of them,
or where each of them makes only a separate promise that
the same performance shall be rendered, each is severally
bound for the performance which he promises and is not
bound jointly with any of the others.
Comment
a. The words "A and B severally promise C $100" or similar
words contain a possible ambiguity Each of them may promise that
o shall receive separate sums of $100, or each of them may promise
that C shall receive one sum of $100. In both cases A and B are
severally bound to the extent of $100, but in the latter case pay-
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ment of one sum of $100 will extinguish the obligation of both to
C. It is a question of interpretation which meamng is to be
attached to the words of a given contract.
b. In this Chapter it is to be assumed m the absence of words
indicating the contrary that where several promises are referred
to, promises of the same performance not merely similar perform-
ances are intended.
ANNOTATION
Hudnall v. Penntngton &- Co., 136 W 155, 239 P 2 (1925), held that a
marketing plan by which growers pool their products for sale through the
agency of a corporation is not a joint venture making each member respon-
sible to the corporation for its dealings with other members where the
corporation obligated itself to furnish each grower with a complete item-
ized statement of his account.
Section 114. Two OR MORE PROMISORS MAKING SEPARATE
PROMISES AND ALSO A JOINT PROMISE.
Where two or more parties to a contract promise the
same performance to the same promisee in such words as
apart from other promises made by them would bind them
jointly, and in the same contract promise separately that
this performance shall be rendered, they are jointly and sev-
erally bound.
ANNOTATION
Partners who each sign a contract personally are severally as well as
jointly liable therein, Barbo v. Norris, 138 W 627, 245 P 414 (1926).
Section 115. A PROMISE IN THE FIRST PERSON SINGULAR
SIGNED BY SEVERAL PERSONS.
Where a promise in a written contract is expressed in the
first person singular, but the contract is signed by several
persons, they are jointly and severally bound in the absence
of express words in the instrument to the contrary
ANNOTATION
The Washington statute is in accord with this section.
Remington's Comp. Stat., Sec. 3408 (7) provides: "Where an instru-
ment containing the words 'I promise to pay' is signed by two or more
persons, they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable therein."
Section 116. JOINT INDORSERS.
Joint payees or joint indorsees of a negotiable instrument
who indorse the same are jointly and severally bound in
the absence of express words in the instrument to the con-
trary
Comment
a. This rule, which is an exception to the general rule of Section
112, is established by Section 68 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
The statute is in force throughout the United States.
ANNOTATION
The Washington statute is identical with this section.
"Joint payees or joint indorsees who indorse are deemed to indorse
jointly and severally" Rem. Comp. Stat., Section 3459.'
*The annotations to this Chapter were prepared in memorandum
form by the late Professor Harvey Lantz of the University of Wash-
ington Law School. His notes were arranged for publication by Dean
Harold Shepherd and Warren Shattuck.
